Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.
DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

DISTINCTIO VI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 123-124.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Cap. Unicum.

Utrum Pater voluntate genuerit Filium, an necessitate; et an volens vel nolens sit Deus.

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate, an necessitate. De hoc Orosius ad Augustinum[1] ait: « Voluntate genuit Pater Filium vel necessitate? Nec voluntate, nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est, praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest ». « Quocirca, ut Augustinus ait in decimoquinto libro de Trinitate,[2] ridenda est dialectica Eunonmii, a quo Eunomiani heretici orti sunt, qui cum non potuisset intelligere nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum Filium Dei esse natura, id est de substantia Patris genitum, non naturae vel substantiae dixit esse Filium, sed Filium voluntatis Dei, volens asserere accedentem Deo voluntatem, qua gigneret Filium, sicut nos aliquid aliquando volumis, quod antea non volebamus; propter quod mutabilis intelligitur nostra natura, quod absit, ut in Deo esse creadamus ». Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate, ut docet Augustinus in libro decimoquinto de Trinitate,[3] ubi quendam catholicam haeretico respondentem commendat dicens: « Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens, an nolens genuerit, ut si diceret *nolens*,

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES
ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTION 6

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Chapter Sole

Whether the Father by will begot the Son, or whether by necessity; and whether God is willing and/or unwilling.

Moreover one is accustomed to be asked, whether the Father begot the Son by will, or whether by necessity. Concerning this (St. Paulus) Orosius says to (St.) Augustine:[1] « Did the Father beget the Son by will and/or by necessity? Neither by will, nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, (nor) can Will go before Wisdom ». « About which », as (St.) Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity,[2] « the dialectic of Eunomius is to be laughed at, by whom the Eunomian heretics have originated, he who, since he could not understand nor did he will to believe, that the Only-Begotten of God, the Word, is the Son of God by nature, that is, begotten from the substance of the Father, said that the Son was not of the Nature and/or Substance, but the Son of the Will of God, willing to assert an accedent [accedentem] will to God, by which He begot the Son, just as we sometimes will something, which afterwards we not do not will; on account of which our nature is understood (to be) mutable, which (defect) far be it, that we believe it to be in God ». Therefore let us say, that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will, as (St.) Augustine teaches in the fifteenth book On the Trinity,[3] where he commends a

absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem *volens*, continuo quod intendebat concluderet, scilicet non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens, an nolens sit Deus, ut si responderet *nolens*, sequeretur grandis absurditas et miseria, quam de Deo credere magna est insania; si autem diceret *volens*, respondere- / -tur ei: »

certain catholic responding to a heretic, saying: « Indeed he in an acutely sane manner responds to the heretic most cunningly interrogating (him), whether God willing or not willing begot the Son, so that if (the catholic) would say *not willing* [nolens], there would follow a most absurd misery for God; but if *willing*, there would conclude continually what He was intending, that is that the Son is not of the Nature, but of the Will. But that most vigilant (catholic) in turn asked him [ab eo], whether God the Father is a willing, or an unwilling God, so that if he would respond *unwilling*, there would follow a great absurdity and misery, which to believe of God is a great insanity [insania]; but if he would say *willing*, he would respond / to him: »

[1] Quaest. 65 Dialog. q. 7, in quo textu Vat. post primum *necessitate* addit *sed*, et in fine ponit *potuit* loco *potest*, at contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 6 et originale Augustini.
[2] Cap. 20. n. 38, sed nonnullis additis; in hoc textu cod. D *antecedentem*; ed. operum Augustini *accidentem* pro *accedentem*.
[3] Ibidem. — Paulo ante sola Vat. post *non voluntate* adiungit *neque necessitate*.

[1] The 65 Questions, Dialogue on q. 7, in which text the Vatican text after the first *by necessity* [necessitate] adds *but* [sed], and at the end puts *could* [could] in place of *can* [potest], but contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 6 and the original of (St.) Augustine.
[2] Chapter 20, n. 38, but with not a few things added; in this text codex C has *antecedent* [antecedentem]; the edition of (St.) Augustine's works has *accident* [accidentem] in place of *accedent* [accedentem].
[3] Ibid.. — A little before this the Vatican text after *not by will* [non voluntate] alone adjoins *nor by necessity* [neque necessitate].

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respondere- /tur ei: ergo et ipse[1] voluntate sua Deus est, non natura. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videns »? Ex praedictis docetur, non esse concedendum, quod Deus voluntate vel necessitate, vel nolens vel nolens sit Deus; item, quod voluntate vel necessitate, vel volens vel nolens genuerit Filium.

to him: and therefore He Himself[1] is God by His own will, not by nature. Therefore what remained, except for [ut] him to become dumb, seeing himself tied up [obligatum] with an insoluble chain by his own interrogation »? From the aforesaid there is taught, that it must not be conceded, that God by will and/or by necessity, willing and/or unwilling, is God; likewise, that He by will and/or by necessity, willing and/or not willing, begot the Son.

Sed contra hoc opponitur sic: voluntas Dei est natura sive essentia Dei, quia non est aliud Deo esse, aliud velle; et ideo, sicut una est essentia trium personarum, ita et una voluntas. Si ergo Deus natura Deus est, et voluntate Deus est; et si Verbum Dei

But against this it is thus opposed: the Will of God is the Nature or the Essence of God, because for God the "to be" is not one thing, "to will" the other; and for that reason, just as there is one Essence of Three Persons, so also one Will. Therefore if God by nature is

natura Filius Dei est, et voluntate Filius Dei est. Hoc autem facile est refellere. Nam et praescientia Dei sive scientia, qua scit vel praescit bona et mala, divina natura sive essentia est; et praedestinatio sive voluntas eius eadem divina essentia est, nec est aliud Deo scire vel[2] velle quam esse. Et cum sit unum et idem scientia Dei vel voluntas, non tamen dicitur de voluntate, quidquid dicitur de scientia, et e converso. Nec omnia illa sua voluntate Deus vult, quae sua scientia scit, cum scientia sua noverit tam bona quam mala, voluntate autem non velit nisi bona. Scientia quippe Dei et praescientia de bonis est et malis, voluntas vero et praedestinatio de bonis est tantum; et tamen unum et idem est in Deo scientia et voluntas, et praescientia et praedestinatio. Ita cum unum sit natura Dei et voluntas, dicitur tamen Pater genuisse Filium natura, non voluntate, et esse Deus natura, non voluntate.

God, He is also by will God; and if the Word of God by nature is the Son of God, He is also by will the Son of God. But this is east to refute [refellere]. For both the foreknowledge [praescientia] or knowledge [scientia] of God, by which He knows [scit] and/or foreknows [praescit] (things) good and evil, is the Divine Nature or Essence; and the His predestination or Will is the same Divine Essence, nor is "to know" [scire] and/or[2] "to will" for God other than "to be". And though one and the same (thing) be the knowledge and/or Will of God, nevertheless [tamen] there is not said of the Will, whatever is said of the knowledge, and conversely. Nor does God by His own Will will all those (things), which He knows by His own knowledge, since by His own knowledge He knows [noverit] good as much as evil (things), but by Will He does not will except the good (ones). Indeed the knowledge and foreknowledge of God is of (things) good and evil, but the Will and predestination is only of (things) good; and nevertheless [tamen] in God one and the same (thing) is the knowledge and the Will, and the foreknowledge and the predestination. Thus, though one be the Nature and Will of God, the Father is nevertheless [tamen] said to have begotten the Son by nature, not by will, and that God is by nature, not by will.

Praedicta tamen verba, quibus prudenter dictum est, quod Deus Pater nec volens nec nolens est Deus, nec volens nec noles genuit Filium, sive voluntate sive[3] necessitate, ex talis sensu mihi videntur accipienda, ut voluntatem praecedentem vel accedentem intelligamus, qualiter Eunomius intelligebat. Non enim ipse est Deus[4] voluntate praecedenti vel efficienti, vel volens, priusquam Deus; nec voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti genuit Filium, nec prius volens quam generans genuit Filium,[5] nec prius generans quam volens genuit Filium. Volens tamen genuit, sicut potens genuit et bonus genuit et sapiens genuit et huiusmodi. Si enim Pater sapiens et bonus dicitur genuisse Filium, cur non et volens? cum ita sit Deo idem esse volentem, quod est esse Deum; sicut idem est esse sapientem, quod esse Deum. Dicamus ergo,

The aforesaid words, however, by which it has been prudently said, that God the Father is neither a willing nor an not willing God, neither willing nor not willing begot the Son, whether by will or[3] by necessity, in [ex] such a sense seems to me (are) to be accepted, lest that we understand a precedent and/or accedent Will, in the manner that [qualiter] Eunomius understood it. For He Himself is not God[4] by a precedent and/or efficient Will, and/or as one willing, before (He was) God; nor by a precedent and/or accedent will did He beget the Son, nor first willing then generating did He beget the Son,[5] nor first generating then willing did He beget the Son. However, willing He did beget, just as able He begot and good He begot and wise He begot and (as one) of this kind. For if the Father, wise and good, is said to have begotten the Son,

quia Pater sicut sapiens, ita volens genuit Filium, sed non voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti. Quem sensum aperit Hieronymus et confirmat, ita dicens super Epistolam ad Ephesios:[6] « De Filio Dei, id est Domino Nostro Iesu Christo scriptum est, quia cum Patre *semper fuit*, et nunquam eum, ut esset, voluntas paterna praecessit; et ille quidem natura Filius est ».

why not willing? since thus it is that for God it is the same (to be) willing, what it is to be God; just as it is the same to be wise, what it is to be God. Therefore let us say, that the Father as one wise, thus willing begot the Son, but not by a precedent and/or accedent will. Which sense (St.) Jerome explains [aperit] and confirms, thus saying On the Epistle to the Ephesians:[6] « Concerning the Son of God, that is, Our Lord Jesus Christ it was written, that *He always was* with the Father, and that never did the paternal Will precede Him, so that He would be; and He indeed is (His) Son by nature ».

Notula. Hilarius in libro de Synodis:[7] « Eos qui dicunt, de non exstantibus esse Filium Dei, similiter qui dicunt, quod neque consilio neque voluntate Pater genuit Filium, anathematizat sancta Ecclesia. Item si quis nolente Patre dicat natum Filium, anathema sit. Non enim, nolente Patre, coactus Pater vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium, sed mox ut voluit, sine tempore et impassibiliter ex se Unigenitum demonstravit ».

Brief Note. (St.) Hilary in the book On Synods, (says):[7] « Those, who say, that the Son of God is from non-extant things [non exstantibus], similarly, (those) who say, that the Father neither by counsel nor by will begot the Son, the Holy Church anathematizes. Likewise if anyone says that the Son (has) been born by a not willing Father, anathema sit. For not with the Father not willing, did the Father, driven and/or lead by natural necessity, since he was not willing, beget the Son, but as soon as He willed, He, without time and in an impassible manner, showed from [demonstravit] out of Himself the Only-Begotten ».

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[1] Codd. A B C D omittunt *et ipse*, quod tamen in ed. operum Augustini habetur. Paulo infra Vat. contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 8 et originale *indissolubili* pro *insolubili*.
[2] In Vat., obnitentibus codd. et edd. 1, 8, *et*.
[3] Codd. A B C et edd. 1, 8 *vel*. Mox edd. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 omittunt *mihi*. Dein post *ut* in cod. A additur *nec*, in cod. B *non*, sensu non mutato.
[4] Vat. contra codd. B C D E et edd. 1, 8 transpositis verbis, minus bene *ipse Deus est*.
[5] Edd. 1, 8 omittunt *genuit Filium*. Paulo infra post *bonus genuit* Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 addit *Filium*.
[6] Super cap. 1, 5. — Omnes codd. et edd. *Augustinus* pro *Hieronymus*. — In cuius textu Vat. sola cum originali post *id est* addit *de* et dein post *Christo* adiungit *in alio loco*, scil. Eccli. 1, 1.
[7] Num. 39. I. et n. 58. XXV. — In cod. A respectu huius notulae additur *et qua Magister non probaverat, Patrem genuisse Filium voluntate, ideo haec nota posita est*. Haec notula in Vat. et aliis edd. ad marginem, in edd. 5, 6 in textu posita est.

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[1] Codices A B C and D omit *and . . . Himself* [et ipse], which however is had in the edition of (St.) Augustine's works. A little below this the Vatican text, contrary to all the codices and editions 1, 8 and the original has *indissoluble* [indissolubili] in place of *insoluble* [insolubili].
[2] The Vatican text, disagreeing with the codices and editions 1 and 8, has *and* [et].
[3] Codices A B C and editions 1 and 8 have *and/or* [vel]. Next editions 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10 omit *to me* [mihi]. Then codex A has (a negative purpose clause) *so that . . . neither* [ut nec] in place of (a clause of fearing) *ut* [lest]; in codex B there is read *so that . . . not* [ut non], the sense of these is the same.
[4] The Vatican text contrary to codices B C D E and editions 1 and 8, having transposed the words, has less well *He Himself is . . . God*[ipse Deus est].
[5] Edditions 1 and 8 omit *did He beget the Son*[genuit Filium]. A little below this after *good He begot*[bonus genuit] the Vatican text contrary to the codices and editions 1 and 8 has *the Son* [Filium].
[6] (Commenting) on chapter 1, verse 5. — All the codices and editions read *(St.) Augustine* in place of *(St.) Jerome*. In which text the Vatican alone, together with the original, after *that is* [id est] adds

concerning [de] and then after *Christ* it adjoins *in another passage* [in alio loco], namely Ecclesiaticus 1:1.

[7] Number 39, I, and n. 58, XXV. — In codex A, in regard to this Brief Note there is added: *and for (the reason) that Master (Peter) had not proven, that the Father has begotten the Son by will, for that reason this note has been placed (here)*. This Brief Note has been placed in the Vatican text and in the other editions on the margin, and in editions 5 and 6 in the body of the text.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VI.

De comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 124-127.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VI

On the comparison of the act of generating to the power.

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 124-127.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate etc.

Moreover one is accustomed to be asked, whether the Father begot the Son by will etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

In parte ista ponit Magister dubitationes emergentes ex comparatione actus

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

In this part of his (text) Master (Peter) posits doubts emerging from a comparison

generandi *ad potentiam*. Et quoniam contingit comparare[1] actum generandi ad potentiam, et potentiam generandi ad suppositum, et ex utraque comparatione incidit dubitatio circa essentiae unitatem: ideo *primo* ponit dubitationem ex comparatione actus generandi ad potentiam; secundo ponit dubitationem ex comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam, infra distinctione septima: *Hic solet quaeri a quibusdam, utrum Pater* etc.

Item, *prima* pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, habet quatuor particulas. In *prima* Magister[2] proponit quaestionem, utrum potentia vel virtus generandi sit producens necessitate, vel voluntate, et determinat veritatem huius questionis. *Secundo* ad istam quaestionem respondet ad hominem

[1] Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *comparari*.
[2] Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Magister*.

of the act of generating *to the power* (of generating). And since he happens to compare[1] the act of generating to the power, and the power of generating to the Supposit, from each comparison there also occurs [incidit] a doubt about the Unity of the Essence: for that reason *first* he posits a doubt from the comparison of the act of generating to the power; second he posits a doubt from the comparison of the power of generating to the Person, below in the seventh distinction: *Here one is accustomed to be asked by certain (men), whether the Father* etc..

Likewise, the *first* part, which contains the present distinction, has four smaller parts [parituculas]. In the *first* Master (Peter)[2] proposes the question, whether the power and/or virtue of generating is producing by necessity, and/or by will, and he determines the truth of this question. *Second* regarding that question of his he responds to the man

[1] The Vatican edition together with some manuscripts reads *it happens that the act of generating is compared* [contingit comparari . . .].
[2] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *Master (Peter)* [Magister].

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contra arguendo,[1] ibi: *Dicamus ergo, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei*. *Tertio* vero opponit contra praedictam solutionem et respondet, ibi: *Sed contra hoc opponitur sic: Voluntas Dei* etc. *Quarto* et ultimo redit ad explanationem primae solutionis, ibi: *Praedicta tamen verba, quibus prudenter dictum est*, ubi explanat solutionem praehabitam.

against the one arguing,[1] there (where he says): *Therefore let us say, that the Word of God is the Son of God*. *Third*, however, he objects [opponit] against the aforesaid solution and responds, there (where he says): *But against this it is thus opposed: the Will of God* etc.. *Fourth* and last he returns to an explanation of the first solution, there (where he says): *However the aforesaid words, by which it has been prudently said*, where he explains the afore-had solution.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

De generatione Filii secundum suas conditionis.

Ad evidentiam huius partis tria principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum conditionem

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

ARTICLE SOLE

On the generation of the Son according to its conditions.

For a clear indication [evidentiam] of this part, three (things) are principally asked.

First there is asked, whether the generation of the Son is according to

necessitatis.
Secundo, utrum sit secundum rationem voluntatis.
Tertio, utrum secundum conditionem exemplaritatis.

a condition of necessity.
Second, whether it is according to a reckoning of the will.
Third, whether (it is) according to a condition of exemplarity.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem necessitatis.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod generatio sit secundum conditionem *necessitatis*, sic ostenditur.

1. Fecundior et actualior est natura in Patre ad producendum Filium, quam sit in luce ad producendum radium; sed lucem necesse est radium producere, ita quod productio in ipsa est secundum conditionem necessitatis: ergo multo fortius in Patre respectu Filii.

2. Item, omne quod emanat ab alio,[2] emanat secundum conditionem necessitatis, aut contingentiae; ergo et Filius emanat altero istorum duorum modorum; sed non secundum conditionem contingentiae, quia tunc contingens esset Filium generari: ergo etc.

3. Item, ab omnipotente detrahere maximum *posse* est impossibile; sed Deus Pater est omnipotens, cuius maximum *posse* est generare Filium: ergo detrahere ei *posse generare Filium* est impossibile. Sed in aeternis potentia est coniuncta actui:[3] ergo pari ratione impossibile est auferre *actum* generationis: ergo impossibile est non generare; sed *impossibile non esse* et *necesse esse* convertuntur: ergo necesse est generare.

CONTRA: 1. Augustinus ad Orosium, et Magister dicit in littera:[4] « Nec voluntate nec necessitate genuit Pater Filium, quia necessitas in Deo non est »: ergo etc.

2. Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis:[5] « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis nec necessitas alia, ut videtur;

QUESTION 1

Whether the generation of the Son is according to a reckoning of necessity.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that generation is according to a condition of *necessity*, is shown thus:

1. More fecund and actual is the Nature in the Father to produce the Son, than is (the nature) in light to produce a ray; but it is necessary that (there is) light to produce a ray, so that production in it is according to a condition of necessity: therefore much more strongly (is such a condition) in the Father in respect of the Son.

2. Likewise, everything which emanates from an other,[2] emanates according to a condition of necessity, or of contingency; therefore even the Son emanates by one [altero] of those two manners; but not according to a condition of contingency, because then it would be contingent that the Son is generated: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, to detract from an omnipotent the maximum '*to be able*' [posse] is impossible; but God the Father is the Omnipotent, whose maximum '*to be able*' is to generate the Son: therefore to detract from him a '*to be able to generate the Son*' is impossible. But among eternals potency [potentia] has been conjoined to act:[3] therefore for an equal reason it is impossible to bear away an *act* of generation: therefore it is impossible that He not generate; but the '*impossible not to be*' and the '*to be necessary*' are convertible [convertuntur]: therefore it is necessary that He generate.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Augustine (says) To Orosius, and (as) Master (Peter) says in the text:[4] « Neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son, because necessity is not in God »: ergo etc..

2. Likewise, (St.) Hilary in the book On Synods:[5] « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »: therefore there was not There a the natural necessity nor

ergo etc.

3. Item, nobilius producens est illud quod dominatur suae actioni, quam quod subiacet actioni; sed agens secundum rationem necessitatis subiacet actioni, quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere: ergo si[6] Pater, qui est nobilissimum agens, nobilissimo modo producit Filium, non igitur secundum conditionem necessitatis.

4. Item, hoc idem potest ostendi sic: quod gratis datur, non de necessitate datur; sed Richardus[7] dicit, quod in Patre est amor gratuitus, quia dat esse Filio et Spiritui sancto: si ergo gratis dat, non necessario.

CONCLUSIO.

Generatio in divinis necessaria est necessitate immutabilitatis, non tamen alia specie necessitatis.

RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est necessitas. Quaedam enim est necessitas proveniens ex principio *disconveniente*, quaedam ex principio *deficiente*, quaedam ex principio *conveniente* et *sufficiente*.

Illa[5] quae provenit ex principio *disconveniente*,

an other necessity, as there seems (in the fundament); ergo etc..

3. Likewise, more nobly producing is that which dominates its own action, than that which is subject [subiacet] to the action; but one acting according to a reason of necessity is subject to the action, because whether it wants to or not, it must do it [quia velit nolit oportet ipsum facere]: therefore if[6] the Father, who is the Most Noble Agent, in a most noble manner produces the Son, therefore not according to a condition of necessity.

4. Likewise, this same can be shown thus: that what is given gratis, is not given from necessity; but Richard (of St. Victor)[7] says, that in the Father there is a gratuitous love, because He gives "Being" [esse] to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: if therefore He gives gratis, (then) not in a necessary manner.

CONCLUSION

Generation among the divine is necessary by a necessity of immutability, not however by an other species of necessity.

I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that necessity is multiple. For a certain necessity comes forth [est proveniens] out of a *unfitting* principle, a certain one (is) out of a *deficient* principle, a certain one out of a *fitting* and *sufficient* principle.

That[5] which comes forth out of a *unfitting* principle,

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[1] Vat. *respondet ad haereticum hominem arguendo*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
[2] Nonnulli codd. ut K W X Y ee *aliquo* pro *alio*.
[3] Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.): Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis. — Paulo infra post *auferre* cod. O addit *ei*. — De conversione harum propositionum modalium *impossibilie non esse* et *necesse esse* cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 3. (c. 13.) et de relatione inter omnipotentiam et potentiam generandi vide infra d. 7. q. 4.
[4] In principio huius distinctionis.
[5] Num. 58 XXVV: Non enim nolente Patre, coactus Pater vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium.
[6] Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *simpliciter* pro *si*. Paulo ante post *actioni* cod. O adiungit *suae*.
[7] Libr. V. de Trin. c. 17-19, in quorum primo capite ait: Gratuitum autem amorem se habere ostendit, qui procedentibus de se plenitudinis suae abundantiam tam largiter, quam libenter et gratis impendit. — Et in ultimo capite dicta recolligens

[1] The Vatican edition reads *he responds to the heretical man by arguing* [ad haereticum hominum arguendo], but the manuscripts and edition 1 are opposed.
[2] Not a few codices as K W X Y and ee have *something* [aliquo] in place of *an other* [alio].
[3] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 32 (ch. 4): For "to be able" differs nothing from "to be by itself" among perpetuals. — A little below this after *to bear away* [auferre] codex O adds *from it* [ei]. — Concerning the conversion of these propositions regarding the manners "*impossible not to be*" and "*to be necessary*" cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 13) and concerning the relation among omnipotence and the power of generating see below d. 7, q. 14.
[4] At the beginning of this distinction.
[5] Number 58, XXV: For not with the Father non-willing, did the Father, driven and/or lead by natural necessity, since He was not willing, beget the Son.
[6] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, has *simply*

ait: Constat namque, quia in uno ex tribus (divinis personis) est amor summus et solum gratuitus; in altero vero sic summus etc. — Vat. mox *quo* pro *quia*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1 et in fine argumenti post *non* repetit *dat*.
[8] In Vat. et cod. cc additur *autem*.

[simpliciter] in place of *if* [si]. A little before this at *action* [actioni] codex O adjoins *its own* [suae].
[7] On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 17-19, in which under the first heading he says: Moreover He shows that He regards Himself as gratuitous love, who to Those proceeding from Himself He pays out [impendit] an abundance of His plenitude broadly as much as liberally and gratis. — And under the last heading summarizing what has been said, he says: For it is established, that in One of the Three (Divine Persons) there is a most high and only gratuitous love; however in the Other a most high etc.. — The Vatican edition next has *whereby* [quo] in place of *because* [quia], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, and at the end of the argument at *(then) not* [non] it reads *(then) he does not give* [non dat].
[8] In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is added *Moreover* [autem].

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est duplex: aut enim est ex ipso movente contra *naturam*, et haec est necessitas *violentiae*; aut contra *voluntatem*, et ista necessitas est *coactionis*;[1] et de istis duobus modis quaerit haereticus, qui sunt valde usitati.

is twofold: for either (the necessity) is out of (a principle) moving contrary to *nature*, and this is the necessity of *violence*; or contrary to the *will*, and that is the necessity of *coaction* (i.e. compulsion);[1] and concerning those two manners, which are very usual, the heretic asks.

Illa similiter, quae est ex principio *deficiente*, est duplex: aut enim est respectu eius, quo res est nata compleri; et haec est necessitas *indigentiae*, ut cibi et potus; de hac dicitur primae Ioannis tertio:[2] *Qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem patientem* etc.; aut respectu eius, quod incurrit ex ipso defectu; et haec est necessitas *inevitabilitatis*, qualis est in morte et in primis motibus; hanc necessitatem incurrit homo ex carentia originalis iustitiae, Psalmus:[3] *De necessitatibus meis erue me*.

Similarly that, which is out of a *deficient* principle, is two fold: for either it is in respect of that, by which a thing is bound [est nata] to be completed; and this is the necessity of *indigence*, as (is) food and drink; concerning this there is said in the third (chapter) of the First (Letter) of (St.) John:[2] *He who sees his brother suffering a necessity* etc.; or in respect of that, which it incurs out of the defect itself; and this is the necessity of *inevitability*, which is in death and in first movements [primis motibus]; a man incurs this necessity out of a lack of original justice, (as) the Psalm (says):[3] *From my necessities snatch me*.

Tertia similiter, quae est ex principio *sufficiente* et *conveniente*, est duplex: aut enim est ex principio sufficiente in *disponendo*, et haec est necessitas materiae dispositae, quae potest dici necessitas *exigentiae*; aut in *complendo*, et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis.[4]

Similarly the third, which is out of a *sufficient* and *fitting* principle, is twofold: for either it is out of a principle sufficient in *disposing*, and this is the necessity of disposed matter, which can be called the necessity of *exigency*; or in *completing*, and this is the necessity of immutability.[4]

Et haec ultima[5] necessitas cadit in Deo, et principaliter in Deo, quia ipse solus est qui sibi omnino sufficit et qui secum omnino

And this last[5] necessity occurs [cadit] in God, and principally in God, because He Himself alone is (the One) who is entirely

convenit. Haec autem necessitas non repugnat libertati voluntatis, sed solum vertibilitati, qualis non est in Deo.

sufficient for Himself and who entirely convenes with Himself. Moreover this necessity is not repugnant to liberty of the will, but only to the vertibility, of the kind that is not in God.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *littera*, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessitate coactionis, quae nullo modo cadit in Deo,[6] et de hac quaerebat haereticus.

1. To that which is objected concerning the *text*, it must be said, that that is understood of the necessity of coaction, which in no manner occurs [cadit] in God,[6] and concerning this the heretic was asking.

2. Similiter et Hilarius intelligit de hac eadem, unde et subdit[7] in littera: *non naturali necessitate, cum nollet*; tunc enim ibi esset coactio, dum reguanaret voluntas.

2. Similarly (St.) Hilary also understands concerning this same (necessity), whence he also adds [subdit][7] in (his) text: *not by a natural necessity, since He is not willing*; for then there would be coaction There, so long as the will is repugnant (to it).

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens per necessitatem subiacet suae actioni; dicendum, quod falsum est, nisi sit necessitas repugnans voluntati. Cum enim est necessitas repugnans, necesse est voluntatem subiici, quia non potest praevalere. Sed quando est necessitas summe consonans, non potens discordare a voluntate, tunc nullam inducit subiectionem, sicut patet. Deus enim[8] necessario est beatus et necessario vult esse beatus; et sicut necessarium est, ipsum esse beatum, ita et velle; sic intelligendum est in generatione Filii.

3. To that which is objected, that one acting through necessity is subject to its own action; it must be said, that it is false, unless there is a necessity repugnant to the will. For when there is a repugnant necessity, it is necessary that the will be subjected, because it cannot prevail. But when there is a necessity most highly consonant, unable of being in discord from the will, then it induces no subjection, as is clear. For[8] God necessarily is blessed and necessarily wants to be blessed; and just as it is a necessary, that He Himself be blessed, so also that He want (to be such); so must it be understood in the generation of the Son.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo[9] obiicitur de amore gratuito, dicendum, quod duo sunt in gratuito amore: *unum* est, quod dat ex mera liberalitate, ita quod nulla est exigentia sive debitum meriti vel naturae; *aliud*, quod[10] dat sine retributione, et quantum ad hoc secundum dicitur amor gratuitus in Patre, non quantum ad primum. Naturalis enim fecunditas Patris necessario est ratio communicandi naturam alii.

4. To that which is last[9] objected concerning gratuitous love, it must be said, that there are two in gratuitous love: the *one* is, which gives out of undiluted [mera] liberality, so that there is no exigency or debit of merit and/or of nature; the *other*, which[10] gives without retribution, and as much it regards this the second is called gratuitous love in the Father, not as much as regards the first. For the natural fecundity of the Father necessarily is the reason for communicating the Nature to an Other.

SCHOLION.

I. Quoad ipsam generationem in divinis cfr. infra d. 9 per totam. — Easdem distinctiones *necessitatis*, paulo alio modo explicatas, S. Doctor habet in quadam

SCHOLIUM

I. In regard to generation itself among the divine cf. below d. 9 throughout. — (These) same distinctions of *necessity*, explained in a little different [alio] manner, the Seraphic

quaestione disputate hucusque anecdota: *utrum divinum esse sit summe necessarium*, ex qua haec inserimus. « Triplex est necessitas: quaedam *omnino extrinseca*, quaedam *partim extrinseca, partim intrinseca*, et quaedam *omnino intrinseca*. Necessitas omnino extrinseca est illa quae ortum habet a principio, quod est extra, nihil cooperante passo; et haec dupliciter habet esse, vel respectu operum naturalium, vel respectu operum voluntariorum; et sic duplex est necessitas, sicilicet *violentiae* et *coactionis*. Necessitas vero partim intra, partim extra est, quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum principii moventis, vel per modum termini quiescentis; et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet *inevitabilitatis* et *indigentiae*. Quaedam vero est necessitas omnino intrinseca, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas *immutabilitatis* et independentiae, et talis necessitas secundum quid reperitur in creatura, simpliciter autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia. Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa. Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in esse divino, quia est in se ipso et a se ipso » etc.

Doctor has in a certain disputed question, hitherto unpublished: *Whether the Divine "Being" is the most highly Necessary*, from which we insert this the following [haec]. « Threefold is necessity: a certain one *entirely extrinsic*, a certain one *partly extrinsic, partly intrinsic*, and a certain one *entirely intrinsic*. A necessity entirely extrinsic is that which has arisen from a principle, which is outside, allowing no cooperating patient [nihil cooperante passo]; and this has "being" in a twofold manner, either in respect of natural works, and/or in respect of voluntary works; and thus there is a twofold necessity, that is of *violence* and of *coaction* (i.e. compulsion). However the necessity partly within [intra], partly outside [extra] is, that which in some manner is by an intrinsic principle regarding [respiciente] something outside and/or through a manner of a moving principle, and/or through the manner of terminus of one resting; and thus a twofold necessity is said (to be), that is of *inevitability* and of *indigence*. However there is a certain necessity entirely intrinsic, which is in a thing out of its own nature; and this is the necessity of *immutability* and of independence, and such a necessity is discovered in a creature to a certain extent [secundum quid], but simply (speaking) it cannot be discovered except in the creating Essence. For It alone is, that which does not admit any dependence; but all the rest, since they have been created, necessarily depend from [ab] It. Moreover this necessity necessarily is posited in the Divine "Being" [in esse divino], because It is in Its very self and by Its very self » etc..

Ultima illa species necessitatis, quam S. Doctor in corp. vocat necessitatem *immutabilitatis*, intelligenda est in sensu absoluto, ita ut eius oppositum simpliciter sit impossibile. Hoc ideo notandum fuit, quia aliqui doctores necessitatem immutabilitatis aliter accipiunt, nempe pro ea qua aliquid ita habet esse, ut oppositum etiam possit esse, sed non simul cum sui opposito (cfr. Brulifer ad hunc locum). — De variis divisionibus necessitatis cfr. S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; et ibid. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in corp.; III. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5.

That last species of necessity, which the Seraphic Doctor calls the necessity of *immutability*, is to be understood in the absolute sense, so that its opposite is simply impossible. This must have been said for this reason, because some doctors accept the necessity of immutability in another manner, namely for that by which something thus has to be, so that the opposite also can be, but not simultaneously with its own opposite (cf. Brulifer on this passage). — Concerning the various divisions of necessity cf. St. Bonaventure, Sent., Bk. II, d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, at n. 3; and ibid., d. 25, p. II, q. 2 in the

II. Quoad conclusionem ipsam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., hic q. 1, et Report., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic

body; Sent ., Bk. III, d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, at n. 5.
II. In regard to the conclusion itself cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1, and Reportatio, here in q. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here

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[1] De duplici hac necessitate cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1 et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 11-16. (c. 12-17). — Paulo ante ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ista*. — De haeretico, quem S. Doctor hoc loco introducit, vide hic lit. Magisteri.

[2] Vers. 17, in quo textu Vulgata pro *patientiam* legit *habere*.

[3] 24, 17.

[4] Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), ubi agit de materiae naturali appetitu respectu formae; et V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.), ubi praeter necessitatem immutabilitatis alias proponit necessitatis species, quae in praecedentibus tactae sunt.

[5] Vat. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, *Et hoc ultimo modo*, et paulo infra post *est qui* minus apte repetit *principaliter*. In fine corp. cod. T cum pluribus aliis post *qualis* omittit *non*, quae lectio explicatur lectione cod. R *quare est in Deo*.

[6] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Deum*.

[7] Substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *et subdit* loco *subiungit*. — Textum Hilarii supra in argum. 2. ad opp. integre exhibuimus.

[8] Fide mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *enim*.

[9] Vat. cum cod. cc. hic omittit *ultimo*, et paulo infra post *dat* omittit *ex*, sed obstant codd. antiquiores cum ed. 1.

[10] Ex plurimus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*. Circa finem solutionis Vat. praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 omittit *naturalis* et in fine *alii*. Edd 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 cum cod. cc *naturae* pro *naturalis*, omittunt etiam in fine *alii*.

[1] Concerning this twofold necessity cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 1 and Of the Great Morals, Bk. I, ch. 11-16 (ch. 12-17). — A little before this from the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *that* [ista]. — Concerning the heretic, whom the Seraphic Doctor introduces at this point, see the text of Master (Peter) at this point.

[2] Verse 17, in which text the Vulgate in place of *suffering* [patientem] reads *that your brother has a necessity* [fratrem suum necessitatem habere].

[3] Ps. 24:17.

[4] Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 81 (ch. 9), where he deals with the natural appetite for matter in respect of form; and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 6 (Bk. IV, ch. 5), where besides the necessity of immutability he proposes the other species of necessity, which have been touched upon in the preceding (points).

[5] The Vatican edition together with codex cc, disagreeing with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, reads *And in this last manner* [Et hoc ultimo modo], and a little below this after *is (the One) who* [est qui] less aptly repeats *principally* [principaliter]. At the end of the body (of the response) codex T together with very many others after *of the kind that* [qualis] omits *not* [non], which reading is explained by thre reading of codex R *wherefore (this necessity) it is in God* [quare est in Deo].

[6] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *unto God* [in Deum].

[7] We have substituted from the manuscripts and edition 1 *he also adds* [et subdit] in place of *he subjoins* [subiungit]. — The text of (St.) Hilary has been exhibited in its entirety above in the 2nd argument of the *Contrary*.

[8] Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted *For* [enim].

[9] The Vatican edition together with codex cc omits *last* [ultimo] here, and a little below this after *gives* [dat] has *by undiluted liberality* [mera liberalitate], but the more ancient codices together with edition 1 are opposed.

[10] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *which* [quod] in place of *because* [quia]. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition, not trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, omits *natural* [Naturalis], and at the end *to the Other* [alii]. Editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, together with codex cc read *For the fecundity of the Father's Nature* [Naturae enim fecunditas Patris], and also omit *to the Other* [alii] at the end.

a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. — Petr. Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. S. a. 54. q. 3. n. 45. seqq. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et se. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. hic q. 1.

in a. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 7, a. 30, m. 3, a. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here in the 1st princ. of q. 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following q., Summa., a. 54, q. 3, n. 45 ff.. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionyius the Carthusian, on this and the following, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following, here in q. 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VI.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 127-128.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VI

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 127-128.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum generatio in divinis sit secundum rationem voluntatis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem *voluntatis*. Et quod non, ostenditur[1] primo per *auctoritates*,

QUAESTIO 2

Whether generation among the divine is according to a reckoning of will.

Secondly there is asked, whether the generation of the Son is according to a reckoning of *will*. And that (it is) not, is

secundo per *rationes*.

shown[1] first through *authorities*, second through *reasons*.

Primo ostenditur per *auctoritatem* Hilarii, qui dicit in libro de Synodis:[2] « Omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, sed Filio natura dedit ».

First it is shown through the *authority* of (St.) Hilary, who says in the book On Synods:[2] « To all creatures the Will of God brings substance, but to the Son He gives according to Nature ».

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate[3] reprehendit Eunomium, qui posuit Filium Dei esse Filium voluntatis: ergo si recte reprehendit, generatio Filii non est secundum conditionem voluntatis.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the fifteenth (book) On the Trinity[3] reprehends Eunomius, who posited that the Son of God is a Son of the Will: therefore if he rightly reprehended (him), (then) the generation of the Son is not according to the condition of the Will.

3. Item, *rationibus* ostenditur sic: Generatio, quantum est de se, est exitus naturalis sive per modum naturae; sed iste[4] est alius modus producendi quam per voluntatem: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, *by reasons* it is thus shown: Generation, as much as it is from itself, is a natural going-forth [exitus] or (a going forth) through a manner of nature; but that (generation) of His[4] is a manner of producing other than through will: therefore etc..

4. Item, Filius est sapientia Patris: ergo si procedit secundum rationem voluntatis, voluntas est prior sapientia; sed hoc est inconveniens, quia cognitio secundum naturalem ordinem[5] intelligendi praecedit affectionem sive voluntatem: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, the Son is the Wisdom of the Father: therefore if He proceeds according to a reckoning of the Will, the Will is prior to Wisdom; but this is unfitting, because cognition according to the natural order[5] of understanding precedes affection or will: ergo etc..

Sed contra: 1. In omni natura ordinata potentia naturalis subiacet voluntati, vel saltem conformatur voluntati, sicut patet in primo homine; sed in Deo est natura ordinatissima: ergo nihil est a natura vel per naturam, quod non sit per voluntatem: ergo etc.

But on the contrary: 1. In every nature the ordinate natural power is subject to the will, and/or is at least conformed to the will, as is clear in the first man; but in God there is a most ordinate Nature: therefore nothing is by the Nature and/or through the Nature, which is not through the Will: ergo etc..

2. Item, consimilis est modus procedendi in imagine[6] creata et in Trinitate increata; sed in imagine notitia oritur mediate voluntate a mente: ergo et Filius a Patre mediante volunate sive per voluntatem. *Minor* patet per Augustinum nono de Trinitate:[7] « Partum mentis praecedit appetitus, quo, dum quaerendo invenimus quod nosse volumus, nascitur proles, ipsa notitia ».

2. Likewise, completely similar [consimilis] is the manner of proceeding in a created image[6] and in the uncreated Trinity; but in the image knowledge [notitia] arises by means of the will by the mind: therefore also the Son by the Father by means of the Will or through the Will. The *minor* is clear through (St.) Augustine in the ninth (book) On the Trinity:[7] « The mind's giving birth does the appetite precede, by which while we, (after) having sought it, are finding what we will to know [nosse], there is born the offspring, knowledge [notitia] itself ».

3. Item, ubi est maior communicatio, ibi est liberalitas maior; sed Pater plus communicat Filio quam omnibus creaturis: ergo maior est ibi liberalitas: ergo cum creaturae procedant per modum liberalitatis, multo

3. Likewise, where there is greater communication, there is greater liberality; but the Father communicates more to the Son than to all creatures: therefore there is a greater liberality There: therefore since

magis Filius, et sic etc.

4. Item, in creaturis[8] in actu generationis simul movet natura et voluntas, et nihil ex hoc filio derogatur: ergo si Pater magis producit secundum se totum quam creatura: ergo multo fortius per naturam et voluntatem.

5. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas Hilarii in terito de Trinitate:[9] « Pater ante omne tempus Filium procreavit, omne quod est Deus per caritatem nativitati eius impartiens »; si per caritatem: ergo per voluntatem.

6. Item, Origenes loquens de mente divina dicit: « Germen proferens voluntatis fit Verbi Pater »:[10] ergo videtur, quod Filius generetur a Patre per voluntatem et quod sit Filius voluntatis.

CONCLUSIO.

Generatio Filii est secundum voluntatem ut in ratione approbantis, non vero ut in ratione producentis, nisi quatenus voluntas est principium coniunctum naturae et quidem sic, ut natura producat principaliter, voluntate concomitante.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod voluntas potest dupliciter considerari respectu voliti, scilicet ut in ratione *approbantis* et diligentis; et sic est respectu omnis boni, sive sit necessarium sive sit[11] contingens, sive creatum sive increatum sive ab alio . . .

creatures proceed through a manner of liberality, much more (does) the Son, and so etc..

4. Likewise, among creatures[8] nature and will move simultaneously in the act of generation, and nothing of [ex] this derogates from a son: therefore if the Father produces a Whole more according to Himself than a creature (does): therefore much more strongly through the Nature and the Will.

5. Likewise, in this regard [ad hoc] there is the authority of (St.) Hilary in the third (book) On The Trinity:[9] « The Father before all time procreated the Son, imparting all that is God through the charity of His nativity »; if through charity: therefore through Will.

6. Likewise, Origen speaking of the Divine Mind says: « Proffering an offshoot [germen] of (His) Will He becomes Father of the Word »:[10] therefore it seems, that the Son is generated by the Father through the Will and that He is a Son of the Will.

CONCLUSION

The generation of the Son is according to the Will as in the reckoning of one approving, not however as in the reckoning of one producing, except to the extent that the Will is a principle conjoined to the Nature and indeed in this manner, that the Nature produces principally, with a concomitant Will.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that the will can be considered in a twofold manner in respect of the willed [voliti], that is, as in the reckoning of *one approving* and loving [diligentis]; and thus it is in respect of every good, whether it be necessary or whether it be[11] contingent, whether created or uncreated or from an other . . .

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[1] Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *ostenditur* loco *videtur*.
[2] N. 58. XXIV: Omnibus creaturis substantiam voluntas Dei attulit, sed naturam Filio dedit ex impassibili ac non nata substantia perfecta nativitas. Ex his verbis patet, posteriorem propositionis partem a S. Bonaventura quoad sensum tantum esse allegatam.
[3] Cap. 20. n. 38. Verba ipsius vide hic in lit. Magistri circa initium. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc *rationem* loco *conditionem*, sed obstant ceteri codd. cum ed. 1.

[1] Trusting in the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have put *is shown* [ostenditur] in place of *is seen* [videtur].
[2] Number 58, XXIV: To all creatures the Will of God has brought substance, but to the Son a perfect nativity has given a Nature out of the impassible and not-born Substance. From these words it is clear, that the latter part of the proposition, alleged by St. Bonaventure, is only in regard to the sense.
[3] Chapter 20, n. 38. See his words here in the text of Master (Peter), near its beginning. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition together with

[4] Substituimus ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *iste* pro *ille*.
[5] Ita vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. cum cod. cc *rationem* loco *naturalem ordinem*.
[6] Vat. cum cod. cc *producendi in trinitate* loco *procedendi in imagine*, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 nec non contra subnexa, in quibus semper de *modo procedendi* agitur. Paulo infra post *ergo* restituimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.
[7] Cap. 12. Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp.
[8] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *existentibus*, quod Vat. cum cod cc hic minus apte addit. Paulo infra cod. O *generationi filii* pro *filio*.
[9] Num. 3: Hic ergo ingenitus ante omne tempus ex se Filium genuit, non ex aliqua subiacente materia . . . sed incomprehensibiliter, inenarrabiliter, ante omne tempus et saecula. Unigenitum ex his quae ingenita in se erant procreavit, omne quod Deus est per caritatem atque virtutem nativitati eius impertiens.
[10] Haec verba referuntur a Pamphylo Martyre inter fragmenta Origenis Comment. in Ioan. tom. II. sub n. 30. ed. Migne (Patr. Grace. tom. XIV. col. 184), secundum quam editionem loco *fit* habetur *factus est*. — Vat. hoc et praecedens argumentum collocat immediate post primum, sed contra mss. et minus bene ob confusionem scil. argumentorum ex *ratione* et *auctoritate*.
[11] In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *sit*.

codex cc has *reckoning* [rationem] in place of *condition* [conditionem], but the rest of the codices together with edition 1 are opposed.
[4] We have substituted with the help of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 *that (generation) of His* [iste] in place of *that (going-forth)* [ille].
[5] Thus the older codices together with edition 1, but the Vatican edition together with codex cc has *reckoning* [rationem] in place of *natural order* [naturalem ordinem].
[6] The Vatican edition together with codex cc has *of producing in a created trinity* [producendi in trinitate creata] in place of *of proceeding in a created image* [procedendi in imagine creata], but contrary to the rest of the codices and edition 1, and contrary also to the subjoined, which deals always with a *manner of proceeding*. A little below this after *therefore* we have restored from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 the particle *also* [et].
[7] Chapter 12. See above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, argument 1 in the contrary.
[8] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged *existing* [existentibus] which the Vatican edition together with codex cc here has less aptly added. A little below this codex O has *the generation of a son* [generationi filii] in place of *a son*.
[9] Number 3: Therefore this Unbegotten before all time begot the Son out of Himself, not out of some underlying [subiacente] matter . . . but incomprehensibly, ineffably [inenarrabiliter], before all time and ages. The Only-Begotten, did He, out of those (things) which were unbegotten in Himself, procreate, imparting all that is God through the charity and virtue of His nativity.
[10] These words are reported by (St.) Pamphylus, the Martyr, among the fragments of Origin's Commentary on St. John, tome II, under n. 30, in the edition of Migne (Patrologia Graeca, tome XIV, col. 184), according to which edition in place of *becomes* [fit] there is had *has become* [factus est]. — The Vatican edition places this and the preceding argument immediately after the first, but contrary to the manuscripts and less well on account of the confusion (this causes), that is, of the arguments from *reason* and *authority*.
[11] In very many manuscripts and edition 1 *it be* [sit] is lacking.

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sive non ab alio, ut patet; haec enim vera est: Pater vult, se esse Deum.[1] *Alio modo* consideratur ut in ratione *producentis*. Et hoc dupliciter: aut prout est principium *distinctum* contra naturam, secundum quod dicitur, quod alia sunt a[2] natura, alia a voluntate; aut prout est *coniunctum*.

or not from an other, as is clear; for this is true: 'the Father wills, that He Himself is God'.[1] In *another manner* (the will) is considered as in the reckoning of *one producing*. And this in a twofold manner: either insofar as it is a principle *distinguished* [distinctum] against nature, according to which there is said, that some (things) are by[2] nature, some by will; or insofar as it is *conjoined* (to nature).

Si prout est principium *distinctum*, sic distinguitur voluntas dupliciter, sicilicet *accedens* et *antecedens*. Voluntas *accedens* est, qua aliquis de non volente fit volens; haec non est in Deo nec respectu Dei nec respectu creaturae.[3] Deus enim non habet aliquam novam voluntatem nec respectu sui nec respectu alterius. Voluntas *antecedens* praecedit effectum causalitate et duratione; haec quidem est in Deo, sed non respectu Dei, sed respectu creaturae solum; omnes enim divinae personae sunt simul.

If insofar as it is a *distinguished* principle, the will is distinguished in a twofold manner, that is, (as) *one acceding* and (as) *one anteceding*. An *accedent* will is (that), by which someone from not willing becomes willing; this is not in God, neither in respect of God nor in respect of a creature.[3] For God does not have some new Will neither in respect of Himself nor in respect of the Other. An *antecedent* will precedes the effect by causality and duration; this indeed is in God, but not in respect of God, but solely in respect of the creature; for the Divine Persons are all simultaneous.

Alio modo, prout voluntas consideratur ut principium *coniunctum* naturae, potest esse dupliciter; quia tunc natura et voluntas sunt principium; aut igitur natura est producens *principaliter*, voluntate concomitante,[4] aut *e converso*; utrumque enim principaliter esse non potest.

In *another manner*, insofar as the will is considered as a principle *conjoined* to nature, it can be in a twofold manner; because then nature and will are the principle; therefore either Nature is producing *principally*, with a concomitant Will,[4] or *conversely*; for both cannot be (producing) principally.

Si voluntas est principium, concomitante natura, sic est processio Spiritus sancti, qui procedit per modum amoris, tamen similis in natura. Si vero natura est primum[5] principium, concomitante voluntate, sic est generatio Filii, qui producitur ut omnino similis et per modum naturae, nihilominus ut dilectus; et ideo dicitur, quod sibi in eo *complacet Pater*,[6] et ad Colossenses primo dicitur *Filius caritatis*.

If the Will is the principle with concomitant Nature, thus there is the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through a manner of love [amoris], yet however [tamen] similar in nature. However if Nature is the first[5] principle, with a concomitant Will, thus there is the generation of the Son, who is produces as One entirely similar and through a manner of nature, nevertheless as the Beloved [dilectus]; and for that reason it is said, that *the Father thoroughly pleases*[6] Himself in Him, and at Colossians 1(:13) there is said: *the Son of (His) charity*.

1. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod generatio est per modum voluntatis sive secundum rationem voluntatis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur aut de voluntate approbante, ut ostendunt duae auctoritates Hilarii et Origenis, aut de voluntate concomitante,[7] ut ratio, quae posita est primo.

1. 5. 6. To that which is objected in the contrary, that generation is through a manner of will or according to a reckoning of will; it must be said, that this is understood either of an approving will, as the two authority of (St.) Hilary and Origin show, or of a concomitant will,[7] as the reason, which is posited first, (shows).

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de similitudine imaginis; dicendum, quod in hoc est dissimilis imago creata ipsi Trinitate,[8] quia ibi non nascitur verbum per inquisitionem, sicut potest nasci in nobis; unde potius valet ad oppositum quam ad

2. To that, however, which is objected concerning the similitude of the image; it must be said that in this the created image is dissimilar to the Trinity Itself,[8] because There there is not born a word through a search [inquisitionem], as it can be born in

propositum.

us; whence it is rather valid for the opposite than for the proposed.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est communicatio in generatione Filii etc.; dicendum, quod maior communicatio vel minor non facit modum emanandi esse secundum liberalitatem vel secundum modum voluntatis, sed modus sive ratio communicandi. Et quia Pater communicat *creaturis* per voluntatem, ita quod voluntas eius est causa producens, *Filio*[9] per fecunditatem naturae: ideo non sic dicitur Filius produci per voluntatem, sicut creaturae.

3. To that which is objected, that greater is the communication in the generation of the Son etc.; it must be said, that a greater and/or lesser communication does not cause [facit] a manner of emanating to be according to liberality and/or according to a manner of will, but a manner or reason for communicating (does). And because the Father communicates *to creatures* through Will, so that His will is the producing cause, (He communicates) *to the Son*[9] through a fecundity of Nature: for that reason the Son is not said to be produced through the Will in the same manner, as creatures (are).

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur,[10] quod in generatione hominis simul movet natura et voluntas; dicendum, quod hoc est propter defectum magis quam propter complementum; quia pater per se non potest generare, sed ex coniunctione cum alio distante, quod fit ad imperium voluntatis; Deus autem alio adiuvante non indiget; et ideo non est simile.

4. To that which is objected,[10] that in the generation of man nature and will move simultaneously; it must be said, that this is on account of a defect rather than on account of a complement; because a father by himself [per se] cannot generate, but (he can) out of conjunction with a different other [alio distante], which comes to be at the command [imperium] of the will; but God does not need another helping (Him); and for that reason it is not similar.

SCHOLION.

I. De diversis modis *volendi*, qui hic tanguntur, Seraphicus in anecdota quaestione disputata: *utrum stent simul Trinitas et summa necessitas*, haec habet: « Est voluntas *accedens*, i. e. de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo, nec respectu sui nec respectu creati propter Dei immutabilitatem et necessitatem. Est iterum voluntas *antecedens*; et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu sui, sed respectu creati, quod antecedit (supple ipse) natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas *concomitans* et *acceptans*; et haec est in Deo respectu sui et respectu creati; approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum sive creatum sive increatum, sive contingens sive necessarium. Tripliciter ergo dicta necessitate et voluntate, tertius modus utriusque competit Trinitati summae, scilicet *voluntas acceptabilis* et *necessitas immutabilitatis*: voluntas, inquam, acceptans propter summam caritatem in producente et summam bonitatem in

SCHOLIUM

I. Concerning the diverse manners of *willing*, which are here touched upon, the Seraphic (Doctor) in the unpublished, disputed question: *Whether the Trinity and Most High Necessity stand together*, has this (to say): « There is an *accedent* will, i. e. arriving from (something) new; and this is not in God, neither in respect of Himself nor in respect of (something) created, on account of the immutability and necessity of God. Again there is an *antecedent* will; and this is in God, but not in respect to Himself, but in respect to the created, which He (Himself) antecedes by Nature and eternity. Third, there is a *concomitant* and *accepting* will; and this is in God in respect of Himself and in respect of the created; for the Divine Will approves and accepts every good whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary. Therefore having spoken of necessity and will in a threefold manner, the each third manner is suitable [competit] to the Most High Trinity, namely

producto, quae duo necessario claudunt in se voluntatem complacentiae » etc.

an acceptable will and *a necessity of immutability*: I say an "acceptable will" on account of the most high clarity in the One producing and a most high goodness in the One produced, which two (qualities) necessarily close (with) in themselves a will of complacence » etc.

II. Quoad processionem Spiritus sancti secundum rationem voluntatis cfr. infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. — Circa differentiam inter generationem et spirationem cfr. infra d. 26, q. 1. et ibi Scholion.

II. In regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit according to a reckoning of will, cf. below d. 10, a. 1, q. 1. — About the difference among generation and spiration, cf. below d. 26, q. 1, and there in the Scholium.

III. In conclusione doctores consentiunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1; et q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 41. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

III. In the conclusion the doctors agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 42, m. 5, a. 1; and q. 43, m. 3, a. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 1; Reportatio., here at q. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2; Summa., I, q. 41, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1 and 3. — (Bl) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in the 2nd principle of q. 2. — Durandus, here in q. 2.

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[1] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et trium primarum edd. *vult esse Deus*.
[2] Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *a*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc hic et paulo post minus bene omittit. Mox loco *coniunctum* alii codd. ut A B D E F G H I X Z habet *communicans*, alii ut K L O P Q S T U W Y cum ed. 1 *concomitans*, sed falso, uti ex subnexis patet, ubi hoc membrum explicatur et ubi omnes codd. ponunt *coniunctum*. Codd. aa bb addunt *naturae*.
[3] Sequimur cod. 1, qui *nec respectu creaturae* addit, quod tamn in aliis mss. quam in Vat. deest, sed minus bene, ut ex contextu colligitur. Paulo infra ope plurimum mss. ut G H Y aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 substituimus *aliqam* pro *aliam*; lectio certe praeferenda.
[4] Fide plurimorum mss. et. ed. 1 posuimus hic et paulo infra bis *concomitante* loco *communicante*, quod minus congrue habetur in Vat.
[5] Addidimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 *primum*, non bene omissum in Vat. et cod. cc.
[6] Matth. 17, 5. et II. Petr. 1, 17. — In textu ex Epist. ad Coloss. 1, 13. desumto Vulgata et Vat. loco *caritatis* habent *dilectionis*, sed mss. et ed. 1 nec non August., XV. de Trin. d. 19. n. 37 stant pro lectione nostra.
[7] Vat. etiam hic *communicante cum natura* loco *concomitante*, sed obstat auctoritas plurimorum codd. et ed. 1. Paulo ante plerique codd. omiittunt *ostendunt*; ed. 1 loco *ostendunt duae* ponit *dicunt*. — Post *ratio* supple: ostendit.
[8] Cap. 13. n. 22: Nostra vero scientia in rebus plurimis propterea et amissibilis est et receptibilis . . . Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei, sic et nostrum verbum, quod nascitur de nostra scientia, dissimile est illi Verbo Dei, quod

[1] The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and of the three first editions reads *God the Father wills to be* [Pater vult esse Deus].
[2] From the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *by* [a], which the Vatican edition together with codex cc here, and a little after this, less well omits. Then in place of *conjoined* [coniunctum] some codices, such as A B D E F G H I X and Z, have *communicating* [communicans], others, such as K L O P Q S T U W and Y, together with edition 1 have *concomitant* [concomitans], but falsely, as is clear from the subjoined, where this member (of the argument) is explained and where all the codices put *conjoined* [coniunctum]. Codices aa and bb add *to nature*.
[3] We follow codex I, which adds *nor in respect of a creature* [nec respectu creaturae], which is lacking in both the other manuscripts and the Vatican edition, but less well, as is gathered from the context. A little below this with the help of very many manuscripts such as G H Y aa bb ee and ff, and edition 1, we have substituted *some* [aliquam] in place of *an other* [aliam]; a reading certainly to be preferred.
[4] Trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have put here and a little below this *concomitant* [concomitante] twice in place of *communicating* [communicante], which is had less congruously in the Vatican edition.
[5] We have added from the older manuscripts and edition 1 *first* [primum], which has not well been omitted in the Vatican edition and in codex cc.
[6] Mt 17:5 and 2 Pt 1:17. — In the text of the Letter to the Colossians 1:13, taken from the Vulgate, the Vatican edition also has *of dilection* [dilectionis] in place of *of charity* [caritatis], but the manuscripts

natum est de Patris essentia.
[9] Cod. R addit *vero*.
[10] Revocamus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 in Vat. et cod. cc omissum *quod obiicitur* et paulo infra substituimus *coniunctione* loco *communicatione*. Circa finem solutionis cod. B *adminiculo* pro *adiuvante*.

and edition 1 as well as (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 19, n. 37, support our reading.
[7] The Vatican edition here also has *a will communicating with nature* [voluntate communicante cum natura] in place of *a concomitant will* [voluntate concomitante], but the authority of very many codices and edition 1 is opposed. A little before this very many codices omit *show* [ostendunt]; edition 1 in place of *the two . . . show* [ostendunt duae] has *as the . . . say* [dicunt]. — After *the reason* [ratio] supply *shows* [ostendit].
[8] Chapter 13, n. 22: However our knowledge [scientia] in very many things, on this account, is both able to be lost and received [amissibilis est et receptibilis]. . . On account of this, just as our knowledge (is) to that knowledge of God, so also our word, which is born from our knowledge, is dissimilar to the Word of God, which has been born from the Essence of the Father.
[9] Codex R adds *however* [vero].
[10] We recall from the older manuscripts and edition 1 the *which is objected* which has been omitted in the Vatican edition and in codex cc, and a little below this we have substituted *conjunction* [coniunctione] in place of *communication* [communicatione]. Near the end of the solution codex B has *another support* [alio adminiculo] in place of *another helping (Him)*.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VI.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VI

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S.**

Quaestio III.

Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem exemplaritatis.

ULTIMO QUAERITUR, utrum generatio Filii a Patre sic secundum rationem *exemplaritatis*. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Super illud Psalmi:[1] *Semel locutus est Deus*, Glossa: « id est, Filium genuit, in quo omnia disposuit »; sed dispositio aeterna dicit rationem exemplaris: ergo si Filius procedit ut verbum, procedit per modum exemplaritatis.

2. Item, generatio Filii a Patre est similis productioni notitiae ex mente;[2] sed notitia procedit ex mente secundum rationem exemplaris, quia exemplar est ratio cognoscendi: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod est imago in producto, hoc est exemplar in producente; quando enim productum expresse repraesentat, imago dicitur. Similiter quando[3] producens expresse repraesentat, exemplar dicitur: ergo cum Filius procedat ut imago, eadem ratione per modum exemplaritatis.

4. Item, omne principium cognitivum rei producendae[4] producit secundum rationem exemplandi; sed Pater est principium Filii cognitivum: ergo producit Filium secundum rationem exemplaris. *Si dicas*, quod illud non sufficit, immo necesse est, quod exemplar et exemplatum differant in forma et natura; hoc nihil est, quia si homo, dum generat hominem, posset talem generare, qualem cogitat, tunc generatio illa non tantum esset secundum naturam, sed etiam secundum exemplar. Sed Pater omnino produxit Filium, ut scivit et voluit: ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod nec illud sufficit, sed necesse est, exemplar praecedere; *obiicitur*: si Deus ab aeterno creasset mundum per

Question 3

Whether the generation of the Son is according to a reckoning of exemplarity.

LAST THERE IS ASKED, whether the generation of the Son by the Father is according to a reckoning of *exemplarity*. And that (it is) so, seems in this manner.

1. On that (verse) of the Psalm:[1] *Once has God spoken*, the Gloss (says): « that is, He begot the Son, in whom He has disposed all (things) »; but an "eternal disposition" means that (there is) a "reckoning of an exemplar": therefore if the Son proceeds as Word, He proceeds through a manner of exemplarity.

2. Likewise, the generation of the Son by the Father is similar to the production of knowledge from [notitiae ex] the mind;[2] but knowledge proceeds from the mind according to a reckoning of an exemplar, because an exemplar is the reason for cognizing: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, (that) which is the image in the product, this is the exemplar in the one producing; for when the product represents in an express manner, it is said (to be) an image. Similarly when[3] one producing represents in an express manner, it is said (to be) an exemplar: therefore since the Son proceeds as Image, (He does so) for the same reason through a manner of exemplarity.

4. Likewise, every cognitive principle of a thing to be produced[4] produces according to a reason for exemplifying [exemplandi]; but the Father is the cognitive principle of the Son: therefore He produces the Son according to a reckoning of an exemplar. *If you say*, that that does not suffice, nay rather it is necessary, that the exemplar and the exemplified [exemplatum] differ in form and nature; this is nothing, because if a man, while he generates a man, could generate such a one, which he cognizes, then that generation would not only be according to nature, but also according to an exemplar. But the Father has entirely produced a Son, as He knew and willed:

impossibile, nihilominus mundus esset productus secundum rationem exemplaritatis.

ergo etc.. *If you say*, that neither is that sufficient, but it is necessary, that the exemplar precede (the act of generation); *it is objected*: (even) if God from eternity would have created a world through the impossible, nevertheless the world would be a product according to a reckoning of exemplarity.

CONTRA: 1. In inferioribus agens per *naturam* et per *exemplar* ex opposito dividuntur, sicut natura et intellectus:[5] ergo *qui* producitur secundum naturam, non producitur secundum rationem exemplaris, sed Filius secundum naturam producitur a Patre: ergo etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In inferior (beings) one acting through *nature* and through *exemplar* are divided by opposition [ex opposito], just as (are) nature and intellect:[5] therefore *he who* is produced according to nature, is not produced according to a reckoning of an exemplar, but the Son is produced by the Father according to nature: ergo etc..

2. Item, omne producens aliquid[6] secundum rationem exemplaritatis producit secundum rationem voluntatis; sed Pater, ut ostensum est supra,[7] non producit Filium per voluntatem: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, everything producing something[6] according to a reckoning of exemplarity produces according to a reckoning of will; but the Father, as has been shown above,[7] does not produce the Son through the Will: ergo etc..

3. Item, formae non est forma,[8] ergo nec exemplaris exemplar; sed Filius est ars et exemplar omnium: ergo non habet exemplar in Patre: ergo non procedit secundum rationem exemplaritatis.

3. Likewise, of a form there is not a form,[8] therefore neither of an exemplar an exemplar: but the Son is the Art and Exemplar of all (things): therefore He does not have an exemplar in the Father: therefore He does not proceed according to a reckoning of exemplarity.

4. Item, quod est in alio secundum veritatem, non est in illo secundum exemplar;[9] sed Filius est in Patre secundum veritatem: ergo non secundum exemplar; sed quod non est in alio secundum exemplar, non procedit secundum rationem exemplaris: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, what is in an other according to truth, is not in that according to an exemplar;[9] but the Son is in the Father according to truth: therefore not according to an exemplar; but what is not in another according to exemplar, does not proceed according to a reckoning of an exemplar: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Filius procedit a Patre sicut ratio exemplandi, non sicut exemplatum ab exemplari.

CONCLUSIO

The Son proceeds from [a] *the Father as a reason for exemplifying, not as an exemplified from* [a] *an exemplar*.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, sicut procedere per modum *voluntatis* et liberalitatis est dupliciter — uno enim modo procedit per modum liberalitatis ipsum quod non est liberalitas, sed quod fit vel datur ex liberalitate; et sic creaturae prcedunt a Deo; alio modo sicut illud[10] quod est ratio liberalitatis, ut amor; et sic procedit Spiritus

I RESPOND: It must be said, that, just as to proceed through a manner of *will* and liberality is in a twofold manner — for in one manner there proceeds through a manner of liberality that which is not liberality, but which becomes and/or is given out of liberality; and in this manner creatures proceed from [a] God; in another manner as

sanctus ut amor, qui est donum, in quo omnia dona donantur — sic per modum *exemplaritatis* est procedere dupliciter. *Uno* modo sicut *exemplatum* proprie; et[11] sic creatura procedit *a Deo* tanquam exemplatum ab exemplari, et sic exemplar importat causalitatem formalem respectu exemplati. *Alio* modo dicitur procedere per modum exemplaritatis[12] sicut *ratio exemplandi*. Et sic videtur procedere ipse Filius, qui dicitur Verbum Patris,

that[10] which is a reason for liberality, as love is [ut amor]; and in this manner there proceeds the Holy Spirit as the Love, who is the Gift, in whom all gifts are given — so through a manner of *exemplarity* "to proceed" is in a twofold manner. In *one* manner as an *exemplified* properly; and[11] in this manner a creature proceeds *from* [a] *God* as an exemplified from [a] an exemplar, and in this manner an exemplar introduces a formal causality in respect of the exemplified. In *another* manner “to proceed” is said through a manner of exemplarity[12] as a *reason for exemplifying*. And in this manner the Son Himself seems to proceed, He who is said (to be) the Word of the Father,

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[1] 61, 12. — Glossa apud Lyranum: Apud se semel (locutus est), quia unum Verbum genuit, per quod omnia facta et in quo simul omnia facta sunt. — Vat. cum cod. cc *disponit* loco *disposuit*, sed obstant ceteri codd. cum ed. 1.
[2] Cfr. Basil., II. contra Eunomium, circa medium, et Serm. super verba *In principio erat Verbum*, circa medium.
[3] Vat. contra multos codd. et ed. 1 *cum*. — De varia acceptione *exemplaris* et *imaginis* vide infra. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; si *proprie* accipiuntur, tunc sunt termini correlativis, imago siquidem est in *producto* sive est similitudo producta, exemplar vero est id, ad cuius imitationem aliquid producitur; si vero *improprie* accipiuntur, tunc non raro unus terminus pro altero adhibetur.
[4] Mss. et ed. 1 hic *productae*, sed infra in responsione *producendae*.
[5] Vide supra d. 2. q. 4. fundam. 2. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *quod* loco *quid* et paulo infra *exemplaritatis* pro *exemplaris*.
[6] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquid* loco *aliud*.
[7] Quaest. praeced.
[8] Cfr. Alan. ab Insulis, Theol. Regul., reg. 16.
[9] Cfr. supra d. 2, q. 1. fundam. 5. — Mox mutila lectio Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittuntur verba *ergo non* usque ad *non procedit*, resarcitur ex aliis mss. et ed. 1.
[10] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *id*.
[11] Supplevimus ex mss. F G H K S T Y et ed. 1 *et*.
[12] Sequimur multos codd. ut F G H I K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 ponendo *exemplaritatis* pro *exemplantis*; lectio in textum recepta magis contextui correspondet. Paulo infra aliqui mss. cum ed. 1 *dicitur* loco *videtur*. Mox ope vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 post *loquitur* adiecimus *Pater*.

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[1] 61:12. — The Gloss in (Nicholas) of Lyre (reads): With Himself (He has spoken) once, because He begot one Word, through which all (things) have been made and in which all (things) have been made simultaneously. — The Vatican text together with codex cc has *disposes* in place of *has disposed*, but the rest of the codices together with edition 1 oppose this.
[2] Cf. (St.) Basil (the Great), Against Eunomius, Bk. II, near the middle, and his sermon on the the words *In the beginning was the Word*, near the middle.
[3] The Vatican text contrary to many codices and edition 1 has *when* [cum]. — Concerning the various acceptance of the *exemplar* and the *image* see below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; if they are accepted *properly*, then they are correlative terms, since an image is in the *product* or is a produced similitude, but the exemplar is that, for the imitation of which something is produced; however if they are accepted *improperly*, then one term is not infrequently employed in place of the other.
[4] The manuscripts and edition 1 here read *produced* [productae], but below in the response *to be produced* [producendae]. [Trans. note: A little after this at *for exemplifying* [exemplandi], the English has no equivalent for this late-Latin verb *exemplo, -are*, which first appears in St. Augustine's 149th Epistle, with the sense of *to adduce as an example* (Lewis & Short); moreover in this context St. Bonaventure clearly uses it in the sense of *to cause in the manner that an exemplar causes*; the perfect past participle, here a little below this, *exemplatum* is accordingly that which is thus caused by an exemplar. Hence the English *to exemplify* and its inflected forms will be employed to translate *exemplo, -are*, though this is clearly a sui generis use of the English verb.] [5] See above d. 2, q. 4, fundament 2. — Then the Vatican text together with codex cc, but contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 reads *what* [quod] in place of *he who* [qui] and a little below this *of exemplarity* [exemplaritatis] in place of *of an exemplar* [exemplaris].
[6] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1

we have substituted *something* [aliquid] in place of *an other* [aliud].
[7] In the preceding question.
[8] Cf. Alan d'Isle, Theological Rules [Trans. note: cited with the title On the Rules of the Faith in the Prologmena, p. LXXXIV, n.1, of this volume of St. Bonaventure's Opera Omnia.], rule 16.
[9] Cf. above d. 2, q. 1, fundament 5. — Then the mutilated reading of the Vatican text and of codex cc, in which there are omitted the words *therefore not* up to *does not proceed*, are restored from the other manuscripts and edition 1.
[10] The Vatican text, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, reads *that* [id].
[11] We have supplied from manuscripts F G H K S T Y and edition 1 *and* [et].
[12] We follow many codices as F G H I K S T Y etc. together with edition 1 by putting *of exemplarity* [exemplaritatis] in place of *of the one exemplifying* [exemplantis]; the reading received in the text corresponds more to the context. A little below this some manuscripts together with edition 1 have *is said* [dicitur] in place of *seems* [videtur]. Then with the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted *the Father* after *by whom* [trans. note: on p. 130].

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p. 130

quo non tantum se loquitur Pater, sed etiam cetera disponit. Unde Filius secundum Augustinum sexto de Trinitate[1] dicitur « ars plena omnium rationum viventium ». Et hinc habet ortum illud quod consuevit dici, quod qui negat ideas esse, negat Filium Dei esse. Et iste modus procedendi[2] secundum exemplaritatem non repugnat processui naturali, immo non potest esse nisi naturalis. Alius vero modus repugnat processui naturali; est enim secundum voluntatis imperium, ita quod producens et productum differunt sicut causa et causatam, et unum secundum veritatem non est in alio.

by whom the Father not only speaks Himself, but even disposes all other (things). Whence the Son, according to (St.) Augustine in the sixth (book) On the Trinity, is said (to be) « the Art full of all the reasons for living (beings) ». And hence there has arisen that which is accustomed to be said, that he who denies that there are ideas, denies that there is a Son of God. And that manner of proceeding of His[2] according to exemplarity is not repugnant to a natural processing [processui naturali], nay rather it cannot be but natural. However the other manner is repugnant to a natural processing; for it is according to the command [imperium] of the will, so that the one producing and the product differ as cause and caused, and the one according to truth is not in the other.

Unde rationes inductae ad hanc partem procedunt secundum hanc viam et secundum hanc verum concludunt; secundum aliam vero nulla concludit, immo ad omnes solvendum[3] est per interemptionem.

Whence the reasons induced for this side (of the argument) proceed according to this way and according to this they truly conclude; according to the other, however, none conclude, nay rather regarding all (of them) the solution must be [solvendum est][3] through interemption.

Illae autem, quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, omnes procedunt secundum aliam viam, quia dicunt, quod[4] procedit per modum exemplaritatis, quod est *ratio exemplandi*; quod patet, quia sumuntur a ratione aeternae dispositionis, cognitionis et imaginis. Ultima vero ratio concludit, quod procedat per modum exemplaritatis, sicut *exemplatum*, et propterea solvenda est per interemptionem.

Moreover those (reasons), which are objected to the contrary, all proceed according to the other way, because they say, that (the Son)[4] proceeds through a manner of exemplarity, because He is a *reason for exemplifying*; which is clear, because they are taken from [a] a reckoning of the eternal disposition, cognition and image. However the last reason does conclude, because it proceeds through a manner of exemplarity, as an *exemplified* (does), and on this account it is to be solved through interemption.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne principium rei producendae, si habet cognitionem, producit per exemplar; dicendum est, quod illud falsum est, nisi ratio cognitionis praecedat, ita quod habeat praecognitionem saltem secundum rationem causae ad effectum; quae ordinatio exigit essentialem diversitatem sive substantialem. Exemplatum enim, secundum quod exemplatum, non est in exemplante secundum veritatem, sed per similitudinem, quae, inquam, similitudo, cum sit ratio cognoscendi et exemplandi, dicitur exemplar. Procedit igitur Filius secundum rationem exemplaritatis, non sicut exemplatum per exemplar, sed sicut ipsum exemplar vel ratio exemplandi cetera. *Et si tu obiicias*, quod exemplar commune est toti Trinitati, respondet ad hoc Altissiodorensis in quaestione[5] de mundo archetypo sive de ideis, quod idea sive mundus archetypus non tantum appropriatum est ipsi Filio, verum etiam proprium.

4. To that which is objected, that every principle of a thing to be produced, if it has cognition, produces through an exemplar; it must be said, that that is false, unless a reason for cognition precedes, so that it has a precognition at least according to a reckoning of the cause to the effect; which ordination exacts [exigit] an essential or substantial diversity. For the exemplified, according to which (it is) an exemplified, is not in the one exemplifying according to truth, but through a similitude, which similitude, I say, since it is a reason for cognizing and exemplifying, is said (to be) an exemplar. Therefore the Son proceeds according to a reckoning of exemplarity, not in the same manner as [sicut] an exemplified through an exemplar, but in the same manner as [sicut] the exemplar itself and/or the reason for exemplifying all other (things). *And if you object*, that the exemplar is common to the whole Trinity, (William) of Auxerre responds to this in (his) question[5] concerning the world-archetype [mundus archetypus] or concerning ideas, that an idea or world-archetype is not only appropriated to the Son Himself, but is also proper (to Him).

Vel aliter potest dici, quod[6] secundum quod exemplar dicit rationem cognoscendi, sic commune est toti Trinitati et appropriatur Filio, sicut sapientia. Secundum vero quod ultra hoc dicit rationem emanandi, sic est proprium Filii; et sic importatur per hoc nomen *Verbum*, ut melius patebit infra.[7]

And/or it can otherwise be said, that[6] according to which an exemplar means a reason for cognizing, in this manner it is common to the whole Trinity and is appropriated to the Son, just as Wisdom (is); and so He is introduced through this name *the Word*, as will be better explained [melius patebit] below.[7]

SCHOLIUM

SCHOLION.

Sensus huius quaestionis est, utrum Filius producatur secundum modum *exemplaritatis*, sicut creaturae. — Paucos ex antiquis Scholasticis invenimus explicite tractantes hanc quaestionem, nempe Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

The sense of this question is, whether the Son is produced according to a manner of *exemplarity*, just as creatures (are). — We find few of the ancient Scholastics explicitly treating this questions, namely, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Middletown, here in q. 4. — Giles the Roman, here in the 2nd princ. of q. 1. — (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 1.

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[1] Cap. 10. n. 11: Ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium. S. Thomas, QQ. disp de Ver. q. 3. a. 1 proxime sequentem propositionem ita exhibet: Augustinus dicit in libro de Civ. Dei: Qui negat ideas esse infidelis est, quia negat Filium esse.
[2] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *ille modus producendi*, sed minus iuste.
[3] Vat. *respondendum*, sed obstant mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
[4] Supple cum codd. I Z *Filius*. Mox et antiquis mss. et ed 1 substituimus *per* loco *secundum*. Paulo infra ed. 1 satis bene *prout est* pro *quod est*. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 1 *sunt* loco *sumuntur*. Mox codd. L O post *imaginis* addunt *et hae sunt primae rationes*.
[5] Adiecimus auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *in quaestione*. — Iste locus invenitur in Summa dicit auctoris in fine libr. I., quae Summa fertur impressa Parisiis 1500. Haec pluries extat manuscripta in bilioth. Laurentiana Florentiae. Ibi in cod. (11. plut. sin. VII.) sub rubica: de Creatione mundi, legitur: « Dicimus, quod exemplar sive idea dicitur de Filio Dei et *proprie* et *appropriate* . . . Sed quia dispositio ad sapientiam pertinet, per *appropriationem* potest dici de Filio, quod sit exemplar vel idea rerum. Sed secundum quod ipse dicitur proprie Imago Pataris eadem ratione, qua ipse est Verbum, et in illa Imagine per dictam rationem relucent omnia: et secundum hoc *proprie* dicitur ipse idea vel exemplar rerum » etc. Paulo post sequitur: « Secundum quaeritur, utrum Filius Dei sit mundus archetypus »; ad quod respondet: « Unde Filius Dei quodam modo est mundus archetypus *appropriate*, quodam modo *proprie*, ut dictum est de exemplari ».
[6] Vat. cum cod. cc *quia*, sed minus bene et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1.
[7] Dist. 27. p. II. praecipue q. 3.

[1] Chapter 10, n. 11: A certain Art of the Omnipotent and also of the Wisdom of God, full of all the reasons for incommutable living (beings). St. Thomas, Disputed Questions on the Truth, q. 3, a. 1 exhibits the next proposition that follows thus: (St.) Augustine says in the book On the City of God: He who denies that there are ideas is an infidel, because he denies that there is a Son.
[2] The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, reads *that manner of producing* [ille modus producendi], but less well.
[3] The Vatican text has *the response must be* [respondendum est], but the manuscripts together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 are opposed.
[4] Supply with codices I and Z *the Son*. Then from the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *through* [per] for *according to* [secundum]. A little below this edition 1, well enough, has *insofar as it is* [prout est] in place of *because He is* [quod est]. Then many codices together with edition 1 have *are* [sunt] in place of *are taken* [sumuntur]. Then codices L and O after *image* [imaginis] adds *and these are the first reasons* [et hae sunt primae rationiones].
[5] We have inserted on the authority of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 *in (his) question* [in quaestione]. — That passage of his is found in the Summa dicit auctoris, at the end of Bk. I, which Summa was publishing at Paris in 1500 A. D.. Many copies of this manuscript exist in the Laurentiana Library at Florence. There in the codex (11. plut. sin. VII.) under the rubric: "de Creatione mundi", there is read: « We say, that "exemplar" or "idea" is said of the Son of God both *properly* and *appropriately* . . . But because disposition pertains to wisdom, through *appropriation* (this) can be said of the Son, because He is the Exemplar and/or Idea of things. But according to which He Himself is said properly (to be) the Image of the Father for the same reason, by which He Himself is the Word, there also glitter in that Image through the said reason all (things): and according to this there He Himself *properly* called the Idea and/or Exemplar of things » etc.. A little after this there follows: « Second it is asked, whether the Son of God is the world-archetype »; to which he responds: « Whence the Son of God in a certain manner is the World-Archetype *in an appropriated manner* [appropriate], in a certain manner *properly*, as has been said concerning an exemplar ».
[6] The Vatican text together with codex cc has *because* [quia: and hence the main clause should

read *it can be said in another manner*], but less well and contrary to the other codices and edition 1.
[7] Distinction 27, p. II, chiefly q. 3.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 130-132.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram dubitatur de ratione Augustini ad Orosium, quod *nec voluntate nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est* etc. Videtur enim sufficiens[8] divisio. Omne enim quod Deus facit, aut facit *naturaliter*, et sic necessario, aut *voluntarie*: *ergo* etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod ipse respondet ad intellectum haeretici, et haereticus intelligit de voluntate antecedente et necessitate inevitabilitatis; *obiicitur*, quod oratio nihilominus in se est multiplex. Sed qui respondet orationi multiplici simpliciter affirmando / vel negando, . . .

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 130-132.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Doubt I

In that part of his (text) there is a doubt about the text concerning the reason of (St.) Augustine to Orosius, that *neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God* etc.. For the division seems (to be) sufficient[8]. For everything which God makes, He either makes *naturally*, and thus necessarily, or *voluntarily*: *ergo* etc.. *If you say*, that (the reason) itself responds to the heretic's understanding, and the heretic understand (it) of an antecedent will and of a necessity of inevitability; *it is objected*, that nevertheless the statement is in itself manifold. But he who responds to a manifold statement by simply affirming /

and or denying, . . .

[8] Multi codd. ut D F K S T V W etc. cum sex primis edd. *insufficiens*, cuius lectionis sensus potest esse: videtur, quod divisio in *responsione* Augustini (ad bimembrem quaestionem Orosii: *Voluntate genuit vel necessitate* contenta, in qua scilicet tertium membrum additur *nec necessitate nec voluntate*, sit insufficiens, i. e. *non bona*, quia divisio Orosii est sufficiens i. e. *adaequata*.

[8] Many codices, such as D F K S T V W etc., together with the six first editions have *insufficient* [insufficiens], of which reading the sense can be: it seems, that the division contained in the *response* of (St.) Augustine (to the two-fold question of Orosius: *Did He beget by will and/or by necessity?*, in which, that is, there is added a third part, *neither by necessity nor by will*, is insufficient, i. e., *not a good one*, because Orosius' division is sufficient, i. e. *adequate*.

vel negando, male respondet, secundum quod dicit Philosophus:[1] ergo, etc.

and/or by denying, responds badly, according to what the Philosopher says:[1] ergo, etc..

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod Augustinus rspondet secundum intellectum haeretici. Quamvis autem oratio in se sit multiplex, quia tamen haereticus in uno sensu eam accipit, iam multiplicitas illa non faceret[2] ad solvendum, quia non procedit secundum illam. Sed distinctio propositionis multiplicis, quando secundum illam multiplicitatem non cadit deceptio, magis est ad ostentationem quam ad veram responsionem.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that (St.) Augustine responds according to the heretic's understanding. Moreover, although the statement in itself is manifold, because the heretic, nevertheless [tamen], accepts it in one sense, still that multiplicity would not cause [faceret][2] it to be solved, because he does not proceed according to it. But the distinction of a manifold proposition, when deception according to that multiplicity does not occur [cadit], is rather for show [ostentationem] than for a true response.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Dicamus Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate*. Videtur enim bene dicere, quia Pater alio est Deus, alio est Pater, quia deitate est Deus, et paternitate est Pater, ut dicit Augustinus.[3] Sed Filius est Deus natura deitatis: ergo hac non dicetur Filius, sed ipsa filiatione.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod ille ablativus potest construi formaliter; et sic falsa est, quia *formaliter* alio est Deus, scilicet natura, et alio Filius.[4] Potest iterum construi *originaliter* et in ratione principii; et sic vera est, et est sensus, quod Filius ortum habet a Patre naturaliter.

DOUBT II

Likewise is asked concerning this which is said: *let us say, that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will*. For he seems to speak well, because by the one the Father is God, by the other He is the Father, because by the Deity He is God, and by the Paternity He is the Father, as (St.) Augustine says.[3] But the Son is God by the Nature of the Deity: therefore the Son will not meant by this, but by the filiation itself.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that that ablative can be construed formally; and in this manner it is false, because *formally* by the one He is God, that is by nature, and by the other (He is) the Son.[4] Again it can be construed *originally* and in the reckoning of a principle; and in this manner it is true, and the sense is, that the Son has arisen by [a] the Father naturally.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Acute sane quidam respondit*, quia Augustinus commendat istam solutionem, quae non est commendanda, quia multiplicare inconveniens non est solvere.[5]

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod est solutio *ad hominem* et est solutio *ad orationem*;[6] et aliquando melius et utilius est solvere ad hominem quam ad orationem, ut puta, quando respondens est discolus et non vult intelligere veritatem, et quando assistentes sunt simplices et non possunt capere veritatem et substilitatem. Ideo quia haereticus veritatem respuebat et adversabatur, idcirco adversanti erat adversandum, et tali modo, quo magis privaretur gloria et assistentes fallacia. Ideo commendat istam responsionem Augustinus, quia[7] manifest opponentem sua quaestione ligavit. Hunc modum respondendi docuit Dominus Matthaei vigesimo primo,[8] ubi dixit: *Baptismus Iannis de caelo erat, an ex hominibus* etc.

Item quaeritur, cum non sit responsum ad orationem, quomodo respondendum sit. Videndum enim,[9] quod divisio haeretici sit per immediata, quia *velle* et *nolle* opponuntur contradictorie, inter quae non cadit medium. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod haereticus quaerit hoc de voluntate accedente sive de antecedente; et tunc neutra pars est vera, nec sunt membra opposita contradictorie, sed contrarie. Nolle enim et velle dicunt actus voluntatis contrarios, inter quos cadit medium. Aliquid enim est, respectu cuius voluntas nec[10] habet rationem causae nec repugnantiae; et ita patet illud.

DOUBT III

Likewise is asked concerning this which is said: *Indeed he in an acutely sane manner responds*, because (St.) Augustine commends that solution of his, which is not to be commended, because to multiply (something) unfitting is not to solve (it).[5]

I RESPOND: It must be said, that there is a solution *to the man* [ad hominem] and there is a solution *to the statement* [ad orationem];[6] and sometimes it is better and more useful to give a solution [solvere] to the man than to the statement, as for example [ut puta], when the one responding is a debater [discolus] and does not want to understand the truth, and when the listeners [attendentes] are simpletons [simplices] and cannot grasp truth and subtlety. For that reason because the heretic was rejecting [respuebat] the truth and was adverse to it [adversabatur], on that account one had to be adverse to the adversary [adversanti erat adversandum], and in such a manner, by which he would be more deprived [privaretur] of glory and the listeners of fallacy. For that reason (St.) Augustine commends that response of (the catholic), because[7] he manifestly bound (his) opponent by his question. The manner of responding does the Lord teach in the twenty-first (chapter) of (St.) Matthew,[8] where he said: *Was the baptism of John from [de] heaven, or from [ex] men?* etc..

Likewise it is asked, since it is not a response to the statement, how must one respond (to it)? For[9] it must seem that the heretic's division be through an immediate (reckoning), because *to want* and *to not want* are opposed in a contradictory manner, between which there does not fall a middle-ground [medium]. And for this it must be said, that the heretic asks this of the accedent will or of the antecedent; and then neither part is true, nor are the members opposed in a contradictory manner, but rather in a contrary one. For "to not will" and "to will" mean contrary acts of the will, between which there does fall a middle-ground. For there is something, in respect of which the will neither[10] has a reckoning of cause nor of repugnance; and thus that is clear.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de solutione Magistri. Videtur enim falsum dicere, cum dicit: *Scientia Dei et praescientia de bonis et malis est*. Dicit enim Glossa super illud Psalmi:[11] *Quae ignorabam, interrogabant me* etc.: « Ars nescit vitium »; sed in Deo est ars artium, ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod nescit per modum practicum, sed scit per modum speculationis;[12] *contra*: solum illud scit hoc modo, quod in eo relucet; sed in Deo non relucent mala: ergo etc.

Item, non videtur Magister solvere ad argumentum; multiplicare enim inconveniens non est solvere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut infra dicetur,[13] Deus cognoscit mala per se ipsum, sicut rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra; nec oportet, quod in Deo luceat malum, sed sufficit, quod luceat in eo mali oppositum.

Doubt IV

Likewise is asked concerning the solution of Master (Peter). For he seems to speak a falsehood [falsum], when he says: *the knowledge and foreknowledge of God (is) of (things) good and evil*. For the Gloss says on that (verse) of the Psalm (,which is):[11] *Those whom I knew not, were interrogating Me* etc.: « Art does not know of vices »; but in God there is the Art of arts, ergo etc.. *If you say*, that He does not know through a practical manner, but knows through a manner of speculation;[12] *on the contrary*: solely that does He know in this manner, which glitters in Him; but in God evils do not glitter: ergo etc..

Likewise, Master (Peter) does not seem to give a solution [solvere] to the argument; for to multiply (something) unfitting it not to solve (it).

I **respond**: It must be said, that, just as will be said below,[13] God cognizes evils through His very self, just as the straight decides what is slanted and light what is darkness [rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra]; nor is it proper, that evil shine in God, but it does suffice, that there shine in Him the opposite of evil.

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[1] Libr. II. Elench. c. 2. (c. 17.) iuxta translationem Boethii: Manifestum, quoniam nulli eorum quae aequivoca sunt, convenit respondere simpliciter.
[2] Nonnulli codd. ut A R T U *fuerat*.
[3] Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1 et c. 6. n. 11 et Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5, ubi sententialiter habetur. Cfr. infra Magister, d. XXXIII. in fine. — Substituimus fide mss. et ed. 1 bis *deitate* loco *divinitatis*, quod et magis correspondet verbis Augustini in loc. cit. et modo loquendi Seraphici, de quo vide infra d. 15. p. II. dub. 6.
[4] Cod. X addit *scilicet filiatione*, quae verba a cod. I non hic, sed paulo infra post *sensus* adiiciuntur. Mox ex multis mss. ut A G H K S T Y Z etc. et ed. 1 posuimus *quod* loco *quia*. — Plura de hoc dubio vide supra q. 2. et infra d. 33. q. 2. et dub. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard., hic q. 3.
[5] Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Topic. c. 4. in princ. (c. 8.). — Paulo ante plures codd. S V W X Y dd cum ed. 1 *videtur* loco *est*.
[6] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. hic et paulo infra ter *rationem* pro *orationem*. Cfr. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.), ubi secundum translationem Boethii, qui pro logos semper ponit *oratio*, sic habetur: Hi omnes non ad orationem, sed ad hominem solvunt.
[7] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *quod* pro *quia*, et paulo infra post *Hunc* male addit *ergo*.
[8] Vers. 25. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. *cum* pro *ubi*.
[9] Supplevimus ex mss. et edd. 1, 6 *enim*, et paulo

[1] Elench., Bk. II, ch. 2 (ch. 17) according to the translation of (St. Severinus) Boethius: It is manifest, since to none of those which are equivocal, it is fitting to simply respond.
[2] Not a few codices as A R T and U have *was not there to solve it* [non fuerat ad solvendum].
[3] On the Trinity, Bk. VII, ch. 1, n. 1 and ch. 6, n. 11 and On Psalm 68, Sermon 1, n. 5, where it is had as a sentence [sententialiter]. Cf. below Master (Peter), Sent., d. 33, at the end. — Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have twice substituted *by the Deity* [deitate] in place of *of the Divinity* [divinitatis], which also corresponds more with the words of (St.) Augustine in loc. cit. and with the manner of speaking of the Seraphic (Doctor), concerning which see below d. 15, p. II, dubium 6.
[4] Codex X adds *that is by (His) filiation* [scilicet filiatione], which words are added by codex I not here, but a little below this after *and the sense is* [et est sensus]. Then from many manuscripts as A G H K S T Y Z etc. and edition 1 we have put *that* [quod] in place of *because* [quia]. — For more concerning this doubt see above q. 2 and below d. 33, q. 2 and dubium 4. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1. a. 3. — Richard (of Middleton), here in q. 3.
[5] Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VIII, ch. 4, at the beginning (ch. 8). — A little before this very many codices, S V W X Y and dd, together with edition 1 have *does not seem to be a solution* [non videtur solvere] in place of *is not a solution* [non est solvere].

infra post *quaerit* addidimus *hoc*.
[10] Vat. cum uno alterove cod *non*.
[11] 34, 11. Glossa interlin. ex Augustino apud Lyranum: Sicut ars vitium, quod per artem cognitum deviatur. — Vide August. in hunc Psalm. Serm. 2. n. 2. — Paulo infra post *artium* cod. G addit *et scientia scientiarum*.
[12] Corrupta lectio Vat. et codd. *sed speculationis* resarcitur ex cod. X, qui post *sed* addit *scit per modum*.
[13] Dist. 39. a. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Vat. hic *dicitur* loco *dicetur*, et paulo infra post *cognoscit* addit *bona in se ipso et*, non quidem falso, sed contra mss. et minus ad rem, quia tota obiectio est solum de cognitione *malorum*. — De propositione immediate sequente Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 85. (c. / ult.): « Recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus. Iudex enim utrorumque canon est recto ». Ulitma verba in translatione arabico-latina sic sonat: Regula enim iudicat utrumque per suam rectitudinem (ed. Venet. 1489).

[6] The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions has three times, here and a little below this, *reason* [rationem] in place of *statement* [orationem]. Cf. Aristotle, Elench., Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 22), where according to the translation of (St.) Boethius, who always reads *statement* [oratio] for logos, it is thus had: All these give a solution [solvunt] not to the statement, but to the man.
[7] The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, has *that* [quod] in place of *because* [quia], and a little below this at *This manner* [Hunc modum] it badly adds *therefore* [ergo].
[8] Verse 25. — The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts has *when* [cum] in place of *where* [ubi].
[9] We have supplied from the manuscripts and editions 1 and 6 *For* [enim], and a little below this after *asks* we have added *this* [hoc].
[10] The Vatican edition together with one or the other codex has *has not* [non habet] in place of *neither has*.
[11] 34:11. (Nicholas) of Lyra's Interlinear Gloss from (St.) Augustine (reads): Just as art of vices, because one deviates through having known art. — See (St.) Augustine on this Psalm, Sermon 2, n. 2. — A little below this after *of arts* codex G adds *and Knowledge of knowledges* [et scientia scientiarum].
[12] The corrupt reading of the Vatican edition and the codices, *but (through a manner) of speculation* [sed speculationis] is restored from codex X, which after *but* adds *knows through a manner*.
[13] Distinction 39, a. 1, q. 1 and 2. — The Vatican edition here reads *is said* [dicitur] in place of *will be said* [dicetur], and a little below this after *cognizes* [cognoscit] it adds *good (things) in His very self and* [bona in se ipso et], indeed not falsely, but contrary to the manuscripts and less to the point, because the whole objection solely concerns the cognition of *evils*. — Concerning the proposition immediately following, see Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 85 (the last / chapter): « For by the straight we cognize both itself and the slanted. For a ruler is by (being) straight a judge of each ». The last words in the Arabic-Latin translation sound thus: For a rule judges both through its own rectitude (Venetian edition of 1489).

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p. 132

Ad illud quod obiicitur de solutione Magistri, dicendum, quod solutionem non ponit, sed innuit contra arguendo, quasi dicat: ex illo unum[1] non potest inferri ex altero, quia quamvis sint idem in essentia, tamen diversa sunt connotata.

To that which is objected concerning the solution of Master (Peter), it must be said, that he does not posit a solution, but nods his head [innuit] against the one arguing, as if to say: from that, the one[1] cannot be inferred from the other, because although they are the same in essence, however diverse (things) are connoted.

Dub. V.

Doubt V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit[2] in notula: quod *sancta Ecclesia anathematizat eos qui dicut, Deum non generasse consilio.* Videtur enim contradicere Damasceno[3] dicenti, quod in Deo non est *consilium*, quia consilium est ignorantis naturae.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says[2] in the Brief Note [notula]: that *the Holy Church anathematizes those who say, that God has not generated by counsel*. For he seems to contradict (St. John) Damascene[3] who says [dicenti], that *counsel* is not in God, because counsel belongs to an ignorant nature.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *consilium*[4] dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur *consulere* accipere consilium; et sic dicit ignorantiam et similiter *consilium*, dictum ab hoc: alio modo *consulere* dicitur dare consilium, et hoc modo dicit scientiam, et hoc[5] potest transferri ad divina. Deus enim nullo modo accipit consilium aliunde. Unde notandum, quod in consilio duo sunt: est ibi *cognitio* rei occultae, et est ibi *dispositio* firma. Quoniam ergo in Deo est verissima cognitio occultorum et invariabilitas, ideo recte dicitur, in ipso esse consilium. Unde Gregorius:[6] « Deus mutat sententiam, sed non consilium ».

I respond: It must be said, that *counsel*[4] is said in a twofold manner: in one manner by "*to counsel*" [consulere] there is meant "*to accept counsel*"; and thus it means ignorance and similarly (does) "*counsel*", (when) said in this sense [dictum ab hoc]: in another manner by "*to counsel*" there is meant "to give counsel", and in this manner it means knowledge [scientiam], and in this (sense)[5] it can be transferred to the divine. For God in no manner accepts counsel from elsewhere. Whence it must be noted, that in counsel there are two (things): there is *cognition* of the hidden thing, and there is a firm *disposition*. Therefore since in God there is a most true cognition of (things) hidden and an invariability, for that reason it is rightly said, that in Him there is counsel. Whence (St.) Gregory (the Great says):[6] « God changes a sentence, but not a counsel ».

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[1] Lectio confusa Vat. *quasi dicat ex eo quod est ex illo, idem* restauratur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
[2] Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit hic Vat. *Hilarius* et post *notula* adiungit *circa istam § Praedicta tamen*, insuper in ipso textu ponit *generare* loco *generasse*.
[3] Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. circa medium: Deus quippe non deliberat, quia ignorantis est consilium inire. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *quia* loco *quod*. Aliqui codd. ut aa bb ff cum ed. 1 *consiliari* pro *consilium*.
[4] Cod. dd addit *aut consulere*. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut C I S V aa cc cum quinque primis edd. *ad hoc* pro *ab hoc*.
[5] In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *hoc*.
[6] Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 10: Deus etsi plerumque mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam.

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[1] The confused reading of the Vatican edition, *as if he says from this what is from that, the same*, is restored with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3.
[2] Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 the Vatican edition here has *(St.) Hilary says* [dicit Hilarius] and after *Brief Note* [notula] it adjoins *about that § However the aforesaid*, moreover in the quote itself it puts *does not generate* [generare] in place of *has not generated* [generasse].
[3] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 22, near the middle: God indeed does not deliberate, because to the ignorant it belongs to go unto counsel. — The Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 has *because* [quia] in place of *that* [quod]. Some codices as aa bb ff together with edition 1 have *to counsel* [consiliari] in place of *counsel* [consilium].
[4] Codex dd adds *or to counsel* [aut consulere]. A little below this not a few codices as C I S V aa cc together with the five first editions have *for this (purpose)* [ad hoc] in place of *in this (sense)* [ab hoc].
[5] In the Vatican edition and codex cc *in this (sense)* [hoc] is wanting.
[6] Morals, Bk. XVI, ch. 10: God, even though He very frequently changes the sentence, never (changes His) counsel.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.